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other incident. This approach emphasi�
zes the development of European politics 
from the birth of the Bismarck’s German 
Empire in 1871 onwards. It was then, 
Münkler claims, that the idea of a “fea�
red powerful actor in the middle of the 
continent” was born. The fear of German 
Reich influenced the decisions of Euro�
pean politicians. “The French were afraid 
of their marginalization, the Russians 
were concerned about the loss of influ�
ence after having been defeated by Japan, 
Austria-Hungary feared for the loss of its 
great power status, the United Kingdom 
was overwhelmed with fear of decline and 
in Germany the encirclement obsession 
reigned”.
Münkler claims that the existing 
“grand narrative” interpretation created by 
the German historians Fritz Fischer and 
Immanuel Geiss and followed by Hans 
Ulrich Weller presents the Great War 
as “predetermined” and Germany as the 
troublemaker whose main goal was the 
world domination. Instead of the concept 
of “Griff nach der Weltmacht”, the author 
puts forward the idea of “the willingness 
to wage a pre-emptive war”. Münkler’s 
thesis of the preventive war is based on 
the claim that if one analyses socio-eco�
nomic structures rather than internatio�
nal relations the responsibility for the war 
lay on all of the great powers. Germany 
was not the only active imperialist power 
in Europe. Münkler states that German 
leadership needed to have two conditions 
fulfilled in order to start a pre-emptive 
war. The first one was to ensure participa�
tion of its ally Austria-Hungary and the 
second condition, concerned the inter�
Der Große Krieg. Die Welt 1914-1918 
(The Great War. The World 1914–1918) 
is the most recent book written by Her�
fried Münkler, German political scientist 
and Professor of Political Theory at the 
Humboldt University in Berlin. Pre�
viously known for his books “New Wars” 
(2005), “Empires: The Logic of World Do-
mination from Ancient Rome to the United 
States” (2007),1 and “Die Deutschen und 
ihre Mythen” (2008), Münkler has treated 
us with an extensive book about the First 
World War. Divided into nine parts the 
book aims to cover all of the aspects of 
the Great War, from its origins and causes 
to its consequences and parallels with the 
contemporary world. All the parts are tit�
led after its main subject but also include 
a range of various themes. This review will 
focus on the questions of the origins and 
causes of the war and partly on its conse�
quences, because the author offers some 
new interpretations of these issues.
The first part, “Long and short paths 
to the War”, deals with the questions of 
the origins and causes of the war as well 
as the guilt for the outbreak of the war. 
Münkler argues that there are two diffe�
rent approaches in researching the origins 
of the war. The “short way” approach is 
based on the assumption that the Sara�
jevo assassination was a starting point of 
the crisis and thus is usually focused on 
the period of less than five weeks prior 
to the outbreak of the war. On the other 
hand, the “long path” approach considers 
the event in Sarajevo as a mere spark that 
triggered the war; had it been absent, the 
war would have broken out due to any 
1 Those are Münkler’s books translated 
into English so far, German editions are 
from 2004 and 2005 respectively. 
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were surrounded by hostile alliances, the 
author does not take into consideration 
that Russia was also cornered by the Dual 
Alliance2 and had already had its great 
power position challenged during the 
Annexation crisis and the Balkan Wars. 
The German position during the July 
Crisis was more provocative to Russia 
and her allies than the author would have 
us believe, and the blank cheque given to 
Austria-Hungary on 5 July was as much 
as aggressive as it was irresponsible.3 Sin�
ce Russia had backed down in 1908 and 
failed in her alleged role of the protector 
of Balkan Slavs was it really surprising for 
the German leadership that St. Petersburg 
was bound to stand its ground in 1914? 
Moreover, the situation in Russia was 
better than that in 1908 when the Ro�
manov dynasty had been shaken after the 
recent defeat in the 1905 war against Ja�
pan. Also, France and Great Britain were 
expected to be more active and supportive 
in case of a conflict.4 Münkler concludes 
that “the key for war” was in Russia and 
that without its intervention there would 
be no major conflagration. This propo�
sition does not seem to be in keeping 
with the author’s thesis of the shared war 
which is incompatible with singling out 
2 Dominic C. B. Lieven, Russia and the 
Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1984), 26.
3 “What is striking about the blank 
cheque is not that it was issued but that it 
was indeed blank. “, in: Hew Strachan, The 
First World War, vol. I: To Arms (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 95.
4 Jean-Jacques Becker and Gerd Kru�
meich, 1914: Outbreak, in: The Cambridge 
History of the First World War. Volume 
I: Global War, edited by Jay Winter and 
Editorial Committee of the International 
Research Centre of the Historial de la 
Grande guerre (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 53.
nal unity of the country. When the crisis 
broke out in the Balkans in 1914 the Dual 
Monarchy was willing to go to war, and 
the first condition was fulfilled. The se�
cond one, the internal unity of Germany, 
was met when the Social Democrats en�
dorsed what the government termed the 
defence of the homeland from the Rus�
sian aggression.
Along with the blank-cheque given 
to Austria-Hungary by Germany, the 
unconditional support given to Serbia 
by Russia, and to Russia by France, were 
equally important for the outbreak of the 
war. Otherwise, Russia would have been 
more careful in her support of Serbia. 
Using counterfactual approach Münkler 
concludes that with the absence of Rus�
sian support the conflict between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia would have been no 
more than the “Third Balkan war” easily 
won by Habsburg Monarchy. Serbia 
would continue its existence as an inde�
pendent state and Austria-Hungary as a 
great power. On the other hand, there was 
a major difference in comparison with 
the great power diplomacy at the time 
of the Balkan Wars: Bethmann-Hollweg 
and the entire German leadership refused 
cooperate with Great Britain and restrain 
Austria-Hungary from its aggressive po�
licy towards Serbia, despite the fact that 
the Serbian government had no responsi�
bility for the assassination in Sarajevo. The 
decisions made in Vienna and Belgrade 
could not have had such fatal consequen�
ces if there had been a different approach 
from Berlin. Nevertheless, other great 
powers, should have better appreciated, 
according to Münkler, Germany’s central 
position in Europe. Instead, they created 
a setting for the encirclement of Germany 
and Austria-Hungary.
Despite his notion of the shared res�
ponsibility Münkler‘s explanation of the 
July Crisis involves certain troublesome 
remarks concerning Russia. After conclu�
ding that Germany and Austria-Hungary 
Reviews 493
dendorff duo which grew in importance 
— and eventually had dictatorial powers 
— after the victory at Tannenberg, on the 
other. Münkler emphasizes the impor�
tance of the ambiguous German war aims 
at the beginning of the war in comparison 
with other great powers. While most of 
the German population saw the French as 
the archenemy, the elites were divided on 
the score. After August 1914 the German 
society was soon transformed into some�
thing of a victimized and sacrificial com�
munity. For the Germans, the war was 
purely defensive. Münkler points out that 
the lack of defined policy at the beginning 
of the war made the German leadership 
pursue divergent war aims. The indecisive 
formulation of strategic goals paved the 
road for the increasing influence of mi�
litary leaders especially Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff.
The narrative then turns to other 
war theatres: the Middle East, East Asia 
and the Gallipoli Campaign. The Balkan 
front is unfortunately discussed in just 
few sentences. The author deals with the 
trench warfare, the superiority of defence 
in military operations, the everyday ex�
perience of soldiers and the development 
of chemical warfare, an area dominated 
by Germany throughout the entire war. 
The Italian entrance into the war did not 
tip the scales. Contrary to expectations 
Austria-Hungary did not crumble under 
attack of this new enemy. Instead, Austro-
Hungarian military reputation recovered, 
mainly due to the fact that the Monar�
chy’s Slav soldiers bravely fought against 
their traditional enemy, and not against 
other Slavs. Münkler concludes his narra�
tive of the events of 1916 with an expla�
nation of psychological effect of the quick 
victory against Romania, and the strained 
relations between the German and Aus�
tro-Hungarian military commanders. The 
author also explains how it was possible 
for Hindenburg and Ludendorff to forge 
such striking careers in the First World 
one great power as a sole keeper of “the 
key to war”. It rather shifts the responsi�
bility from Germany onto Russia.
Münkler offers an extensive, interes�
ting and vivid history of the war from 
its beginning until November 1918. His 
account of the war operations based on 
the writings and testimonies of the com�
batants create the sense of gruesome rea�
lity. At the outset of second chapter the 
author discusses the main idea behind the 
German strategy, the Schlieffen Plan. The 
plan assumed that Britain would remain 
neutral in the case of a European war. 
The first battles of the war were heavily 
influenced, besides military strategy, by 
prestige considerations. One of the as�
sumptions of the Schlieffen Plan was that 
it was necessary to withdraw forces in the 
East to the strategically better positions 
within German territory in order to gain 
enough time to win the decisive battle 
against France. Such a plan discounted 
the fact that the ancestral lands of the 
Hohenzollern dynasty would be handed 
over to the enemy. Similar considerations 
were at work in Austria-Hungary where 
the decision to attack Serbia with the 
third of the Austro-Hungarian forces was 
based on the Chief of Staff, Conrad von 
Hötzendorf ’s, considered opinion that 
the defensive in the Balkans would be a 
blow at the Dual Monarchy’s prestige. At 
the beginning of 1915, the Dual Monar�
chy lost much of its prestige because of 
the military disaster after the defeats in 
Serbia, and its great power status after the 
defeats at the hands of the Russians. For 
the remainder of the war Austria-Hun�
gary was entirely dependent on German 
support.
Following his accounts of the Battles 
at Marne and Tannenberg Münkler argues 
that the decisions about the war aims re�
sulted from the struggle between the mo�
derate Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, 
on one hand, and the new Chief of Staff 
Falkenhayn and the Hindenburg-Lu�
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with the legacies of the conflict. The author 
states that the collapse of the three great 
empires of the East, Romanov, Habsburg 
and Ottoman, meant the continuation of 
wars in Eastern Europe. The hostilities in 
the West were ended on November 11, 
1918 but in Eastern Europe they were 
continued through the Russian Civil 
War, the Polish-Russian war, fighting in 
the Baltic States and Greek-Turkish war. 
The war also left the Balkan states, Ser�
bia, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania with 
the ambitions for the inclusion of their 
population outside of the state borders. 
Such problems, claims Münkler, still pre�
sent the security challenge for the Euro�
pean Union. In addition to the Balkans, 
the political situation in the Middle East 
and the Caucasus region is also still do�
minated by the legacy of the Great War. 
Such thesis lacks a more critical approach 
to the imperial and colonial policies led 
before and after the First World War by 
the Great Powers. The contested borders 
among Balkan and Middle East countries 
have remained, to a large extent the legacy 
of those policies. Finally, Münkler makes 
an interesting comparison between the 
21st century China and Wilhelmine Ger�
many based on their similar economic and 
political rise and fears of their neighbours. 
Therefore, the greatest contemporary res�
ponsibility is placed in the hands of the 
United States leadership which have to 
make sure that its policies do not lead to 
the encirclement of China.
Apart from the previous remarks, the 
title of the book is entirely misleading: it 
is a detailed narrative about Germany in 
the First World War rather than a global 
history of the conflict. Nonetheless, the 
vivid, and smooth writing style and the 
interesting new assumptions make this 
book an excellent addition to the ever-
growing literature on the First World 
War. 
War. Their rise owed so much to the skil�
ful praise of publicists and journalists as 
to the victories achieved against the tacti�
cally weaker opponent.
The next two chapters, “Extension of 
the struggle” and “The exhausting war” of�
fer an extensive and detailed description 
of the air and sea warfare, the mythical 
battles of Verdun and Jutland and the 
development of the U-boat war, which 
brought about, according to Münkler, the 
entrance of the United States into the 
war. Some interesting German plans such 
as utilising the Jihad in order to turn the 
Allied Muslim subjects into rebels and 
creating, for example the anti-Russian Po�
lish legion are also outlined. In the similar 
fashion, Germany supported the Bolshe�
viks in Russia and eventually provided 
them with several million Reichsmarks 
post-April 1917. Such support contribu�
ted to their seizure of power. Münkler 
professes that 1917 marked the end of the 
Eurocentric world order.
The last year of the war saw the for�
mation of “Deutsch Ostimperium”, based 
on the harsh terms of the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk concluded with the Russian 
Bolshevik government. From the early 
summer of 1918 the idea of a “great battle” 
in the West emerged in Berlin despite the 
overstretching of German troops across 
Europe. The disintegration of the Russian 
army, the conquest of the Baltic States 
and the occupation of Ukraine opened the 
way for it. Ludendorff completely rejected 
all the suggestions for ceasefire or peace 
negotiations. The “Michael Offensive”, 
envisaged as a decisive battle in the Wes�
tern Front, failed to achieve any strategic 
goals. With the Germans no longer active 
in the West the Macedonian front proved 
to have been was the “Achilles heel” of the 
Central Powers. In November 1918, Cen�
tral Europe was shaken by revolutionary 
changes.
The last chapter of the book “The First 
World War as a political challenge” deals 
